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Changing Lanes: Intellectual Property
Rights, Trade and Investment
ByJULIEN CHAISSE* AND PUNEETH NAGARAJ**
Abstract: Trademarks are inherent features of transnational
business transactions. From a trade perspective, a trademark is used
by a business as an identification sign to distinguish its goods or
services from those of its competitors. Trademarks are also a form of
investment as they are valuable business assets; they can be sold or
licensed. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the
international economic rules that apply to transnational business
activities requiring trademark protection. It answers the key
question: What is the role of trade and investment treaties in ensuring
trademarks are duly respected? The paper demonstrates that some
trademark infringement is simultaneously covered by both TRIPS
and IIAs. The WTO case law on the trademark is reviewed with a
particular focus on the substance of the case " United States -Section
211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998." Then, the paper expands
the analysis to investigate the role of investment treaties that often
include intangible assets (and hence trademark) as a form of
protected foreign investment, while the investor-state mechanism
allows foreign companies to promptly sue host states. This paper
explores recent regulatory and litigation experiences to show that the
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fair and equitable treatment and expropriation provisions typical of
investment treaties offer grounds for economic operators to have
their rights protected under IIAs.
Keywords: Trademark, intellectual property rights, World Trade
Organization; Investment treaties, intellectual property rights,
expropriation
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Ever since the industrial revolution, intellectual property rights
(IPRs) in their different forms-ranging from copyright, trademarks,
geographical indications, industrial designs, layout designs
(topographies) and integrated circuits, to patents, as well as the
protection against unfair competition--have played an important role
in the commercial law of industrialized countries.' With the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS),2 IPRs have become a mandatory part of the WTO system,
binding on all members alike and fully subject to WTO dispute
settlement.3 TRIPS, which is structurally different from any other
WTO agreement, is the primary agreement harmonizing IPRs,
essentially providing for minimal standards.4
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1. See Edward W. Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the
Prerogative and at Common Law, 12 LAW Q. REV. 141, 152 (1896). CHRISTINE
MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT
SYSTEM 1660-1800 12 (1988), both cited by Matthew Fisher, Intellectual Property
Quarterly Extracting the Price of a Patent: Enablement and Written Description, 2
INTELL. PROP. Q. 4, 262-88 (2012). See also, Robert P. Merges, Battle of
Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and Trade, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 239 (1990. Laurence
R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual PropertyLawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 55-61 (2004).
2. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS ].
3. Susan Sell, Intellectual Property and Public Policy in Historical Perspective:
Contestation and Settlement, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 267 (2004).
4. TRIPS reflects the importance of effective protection of intellectual property
rights. It was argued before that this is an important ingredient of the rule of law
and good governance. At the same time, the agreement emphasises that the goals of
social and economic development need to be considered in shaping intellectual
property regimes. The agreement seeks to carefully balance private rights and the
2252014]1
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The effect of TRIPS on technology diffusion holds significant
implications for economic growth. IPRs give businesses an incentive
to invest in research and development, and ultimately lead to the
creation of innovative products and processes. However, IP violation
in some countries is rampant.5 It involves, for instance, pirated CDs
and DVDs, imitations of brand-name products, computer software
and automobile spare parts and even involves violation of
pharmaceutical IPRs (where in some cases fake drugs may harm
consumers' safety). 6 Transnational investors, whose IPRs are violated
by individuals located in a different state, have no recourse unless the
infringement can be attributed to the actions of the host state. Under
International Investment Agreements (IIAs), the investor does not
have a cause of action against a private party, even if there is
infringement on a large scale.7 Hence, the onus is on the state to
strengthen its IPR protection to safeguard investors. As a
consequence, countries have played an important role over the years
in advancing the protection of intellectual property rights. For
example, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam have each
strengthened their domestic IP legislation and enforcement, or beefed
up international cooperation, to combat IP violation.
public domain. Thomas Cottier & Marina Foltea, Global Governance in Intellectual
Property Protection: Does the Decision-making Forum Matter?, 3(2) WIPO J. 139,
140 (2012) (explaining that "[tihe minimal standards set out in the TRIPS Agreement
have been criticized for being too rigid and for not sufficiently taking into account
different levels of social and economic development."). See also, Antony Taubman,
Rethinking TRIPS: 'Adequate Remuneration'for Non- Voluntary Patent Licensing,
11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 927, 935 (2008), (discussing efforts in the Doha Round to
improve access to patented pharmaceuticals in developing countries).
5. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 SPECIAL 301
REPORT, 19 (2008) available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset-upload-file55 314869.pdf (illustrating
the United States' constant frustration with China's inability to protect IPR
specifically by putting China on the Priority Foreign Country Watch List for
epidemic infringements of IPR for consecutive years from 2005 to 2010). See also,
Daniel C. K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China, and 78 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1, 9 (2000) (stating that there are no specific definitions of counterfeiting under
Chinese law, but a number of different legal provisions that refer generally to
trademark infringement and broadly encompass counterfeiting).
6. Philip Stevens & Julian Harris, International Policy Network: Fake Scare
About Fake Drugs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 15, 2009, 12:56 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org /2009/12/15/international-policy-network-fake-scare-about-fake-drugs/.
7. Id
8. See generally, Frangois Dessemontet, From Exhaustion to Enhancement:
Recounting Four Decades of Research and Teaching in Intellectual Property, 4 (2)
WIPO J. 254, 257-58 (2013). See Michael Blakeney, Fighting Product Piracy: Law
226 [Vol. 37:2
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From an economic perspective, intellectual property rights
essentially grant an extensive monopoly right over the economic
exploitation of ideas, the expression of ideas, and distinctive words or
symbols. It is a matter of protecting investment, creating incentives
for future investment, and facilitating identification in distributed
markets. The most important function of IPRs is hindering others
from free-riding on someone else's investment of capital and labor.
IPRs are necessary ingredients of free trade,9 and further efforts have
been made to increase protection of IPRs in recent years through the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).o
A trademark is a word (or words), a design, or a combination of
these, used to identify the goods or services of one person or
organization. In the world of trade and international business,
trademark is often referred to as a brand, or a brand name, and is
used by businesses as an identification sign to distinguish their goods
or services from those of competitors. As such, a considerable
number of businesses that operate across national borders require
strong protection of their trademark. Furthermore, trademarks are a
and Strategies in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain, UK, China, USA, 33 (5)
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 335 (2011). See also, Atthachai Homhuan, Thailand to
Crack Down on Illegal Online Pharmacies, 15(6) E-COM. L. & POL'Y 10 (2013),
(considering issues raised by the sale of drugs and counterfeits by illegal online
pharmacies, including the risks to consumers, and focusing on steps by the Thai
Government to combat the problem).
9. Nonetheless, a substantial degree of doubt persists, in particular among
developing country governments and NGOs as to the wisdom and equity of making
IPRs a mandatory part of WTO law. While some oppose the idea, others focus on
the adequate degree of protection and on the proper balance of private and public
domains-a balance which should be commensurate with social and economic
development. See Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Economic
Justifications for the Grant of Intellectual Property Rights: Patterns of Convergence
and Conflict, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION 99,
100-05 (Frederick Abbott & David J. Gerber eds., 1997).
10. The ACTA trade agreement, signed (but not ratified) in May 2011 by the
United States, Japan, Switzerland, and the EU, requires that its parties add criminal
penalties, including incarceration and fines, for copyright and trademark
infringement, and obligates the parties to actively police for infringement. See
Robin Fry, ACTA on its Knees, INTELL. PROP. MAG., Apr. 2, 2012 (discussing why
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has proved controversial, resulting in
widespread agitation and a referral to the European Court of Justice to determine its
compatibility with the EU's fundamental rights and freedoms, including the secrecy
surrounding its negotiation and its provisions requiring internet service providers to
disclose the details of subscribers suspected of copyright or trade mark infringement.
Also presents a timeline of the Agreement's development).
2014] 227
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form of investment because they are valuable business assets that can
be sold or licensed. Trademark protection is of key importance to
many transnational investors.
Infringement of a trademark may occur when one party, the
"infringer," uses a trademark that is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark owned by another party, in relation to products or services
which are identical or similar to the products or services which the
registration covers. An owner of a trademark may commence civil
legal proceedings against a party that infringes its registered trademark.
Similar to a trademark, a trade name is the official name under
which a company does business. It is also known as a "doing business
as" name, assumed name, or fictitious name. However, a trade name
does not afford any brand name protection or provide a company
with unlimited rights for the use of that name. Instead, a trademark
is used to protect the brand name and can be associated with that
name. A trademark can also protect symbols, logos, slogans,
gustatory, scent, touch, sound, color and 3-D marks. These can be
registered as trademarks in an increasing number of jurisdictions as
long as source identification, graphical representation, and
nonfunctionality and distinctiveness criteria are met.
This article offers a much-needed practical perspective because the
regulation of trademark is different in many jurisdictions. In the United
States, the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 criminalized the
intentional trade in counterfeit goods and services. In many countries (but
not in countries such as the United States, which recognizes common law
trademark rights), a trademark that is not registered cannot be "infringed"
as such, and the trademark owner cannot bring infringement proceedings.
Instead, the owner may be able to commence proceedings under the
common law for "passing off" or misrepresentation, or under legislation
that prohibits unfair business practices. Differences at the national level are
made even more complex by the multiplicity of norms at the international
level. Although historically TRIPS may be seen as an important agreement
for trademark owners to pursue their rights abroad, some new treaties
regulating cross-border investment that have emerged are relevant to our
study. 1
11. Julien Chaisse, The Regulatory Framework of International Investment: The
Challenge of Fragmentation in a Changing World Economy, in THE PROSPECTS OF
INTERNA TIONAL TRADE REGULA TION - FROM RAGMENTA TION TO COHERENCE 417
(Thomas Cottier & Panagiotis Delimatsis, eds, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010).
228 [Vol. 37:2
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This paper analyses the relevance of trade and investment
treaties in trademark infringement cases involving a foreign
jurisdiction. This paper also provides a comprehensive analysis of the
role that TRIPS and investment treaties play in the protection of
trademark across borders, and the potential significance of Phlip
12Morris v. Australia, a pending case relating to this issue.
H. Regulating Trademark in the TRIPS
The international legal and institutional framework for
cooperation in the protection of intellectual property rights has
evolved over the last hundred years. 13 However, until the WTO
came into force and IPRs were included under the umbrella of the
multilateral trading system, the framework for cooperation fell short
of elaborating a comprehensive set of universal, harmonized
standards that would have been enforceable through binding dispute
settlement.14 Due to significantly different perceptions of the role of
intellectual property in the process of economic development, as well
as diverging traditions among industrialized countries, substantive
global standards with respect to intellectual property have remained
largely open and permissive in nature. With the advent of TRIPS, the
trading system fundamentally changed its relationship to IPRs.
TRIPS is a comprehensive agreement that builds upon and
12. In June 2011, Philip Morris initiated investment arbitration against the State
of Australia, challenging its plain packaging law. One of the key issue relates to
Philip Morris's trademark protection in Australia which, for the first time in history,
is claimed to be protected by an international investment treaty. See Bryan
Mercurio, Public Health Law Case Study: Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH AND ASIA (Sian Griffiths ed.,
2014).
13. Since the adoption of the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property and the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, a host of multilateral agreements, providing for both substantive
and procedural rules, have sought to protect innovation and creativity by allocating
exclusive intellectual property rights (IPRs). Most of this body of international law
was developed within the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a UN
specialised organisation, and in additional regional organisations. See Frederick M.
Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property
Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22(4) VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
689 (1989). See also Bashar H. Malkawi, A Long "TRIP" Home: How the Berne
Convention, TRIPS Agreement, and Other Instruments Complement the
International Copyright System, 35(2) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 93, 93-107 (2013).
14. See Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules
Through Negotiations and Sanctions: The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism
and Dispute Settlement System, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 153 (2007).
20141 229
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15incorporates the Paris and Berne Conventions, and enacts
procedural norms that emerged after long and difficult negotiations.
TRIPS sets forth the essential elements regarding the level of
protection that member-states must accord to intellectual property.
However, TRIPS norms are not typically considered formal norms of
international harmonization that set limits on domestic protection of
intellectual property, except in the field of procedure and
enforcement. The prevailing view is that TRIPS merely sets out
minimal substantive standards. Thus, it allows members to introduce
stronger protection than the minimums set forth in the agreement.16
In addition to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(GAT[ 1994) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), TRIPS emerged as the third pillar of the multilateral trading
17system.
15. The incorporation of other international agreements is a novel and unique
feature in WTO law, perhaps in international law in general. It is not without
difficulties. In the following case, the Appellate Body determined, inter alia,
whether trade names are covered by TRIPS. See Appellate Body Report, United
States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R 928
(Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Havana Club].
16. Article 1 § 1 expressly allows members to adopt "more extensive protection,"
provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of the agreement.
Additionally, Article 1 § 2 defines the nature and scope of obligations and the
pertinent notion of "intellectual property." Part II of the agreement covers all
relevant fields and forms of IPRs: copyright (including computer programs and
databases), trademarks and service marks, geographical indications, industrial
designs, patents for invention, topographies of integrated circuits and trade secrets
(undisclosed information). See Tanguy de Haan, Plain Packaging: Expropriation
andDisproportion, 35(9) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 497-506 (2013).
Additional obligations stem from the incorporation of pre-existing
agreements as defined in footnote 2 to Article 1. Article 2 obliges members to
comply with the substantive provisions of the widely adopted Stockholm Act of 1967
of the 1883 Paris Convention which covers aspects of patents, trademarks, trade
names and protection against unfair competition. Article 9 incorporates the
substantive provisions of the Paris Act of 1971 of the 1886 Berne Convention
covering copyright, and Article 35 incorporates the Washington Treaty on the
Protection of Integrated Circuits, which has never come into force. These provisions
form an integral part of the agreement's obligations with respect to intellectual
property. The 1961 Rome Convention, addressing the rights of performers,
producers and broadcasters (neighbouring rights) is referred to in various Articles
but is not formally incorporated into the agreement.
17. See Thomas Cottier, The TRIPs Agreement, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 917 (Patrick F. J.
Macrory et al. eds., 2005). See also Bashar H. Malkawi, A Long "TRIP" Home:
How the Berne Convention, TRIPS Agreement, and Other Instruments Complement
the International Copryight System, 35(2) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 93-107 (2013).
230 [Vol. 37:2
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The principles of National Treatment (NT) and Most Favored
Nation (MFN) treatment are explicitly stipulated in TRIPS (Articles
3 and 4). They provide a significant step beyond the traditions of
bilateral protection enshrined and permitted by the Paris and Berne
Conventions and lay the cornerstone for further improvements of
international protection of IPRs. 8 It will no longer be possible to
enter into bilateral agreements granting exclusively bilateral
privileges beyond NT.
A. Exhaustion of Rights and Parallel Trade
Regulation of parallel trade is an important issue related to
intellectual property.19 Parallel trade is the importation of original
products outside of, and thus parallel to, the contractually agreed
channels of commerce. It occurs if price differentials render
international trade from a low-priced market into a higher priced
20market lucrative for traders and possibly for consumers. Whether or
not parallel trade is lawful (some prefer to call it a "gray area") is
inherently linked to the doctrine of exhaustion of rights.
At the domestic level, IPRs with respect to specific products are
exhausted as soon as the products are put on the market and sold by
the right-holder or sold with the right-holder's consent (e.g., by way
of a license agreement). 2 2 Once a right-holder sells a product on the
18. Actually, both the Paris and Berne Conventions are already based on NT, so
TRIPS key innovation is really the MFN.
19. Marianne Buckley, Looking Inward: Regional Parallel Trade as a Means of
Bringing Affordable Drugs To Africa, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 625 (2011)
(considering that strong regulation of parallel trade is necessary to ensure the safety
of the parallel imports and reduce possible corruption of the system). See generally
loannis Avgoustis, Parallel Imports and Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights: Should
Steps Be Taken Towards an International Exhaustion Regime? 34(2) EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 108, 108-21 (2012).
20. See Lucy Harrold, Fighting for Pharmaceutical Profits, 24(10) EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 497,497-503 (2002).
21. The American concept of exhaustion of intellectual property rights, or the
"first-sale" doctrine as it is known in the U.S., originally appeared in 1873 in Adams v
Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873), where the Supreme Court held that the exclusive right
of a patentee to use or sell is exhausted as to a given article that incorporates the
invention upon the first valid sale either by the patentee or by an authorised licensee.
On the exhaustion of rights, see Thomas Cottier, The Exhaustion of Intellectual
Property Rights - A Fresh Look, 39(7) INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
755, 755-57 (2008) (arguing that Exhaustion of rights, or the doctrine of first sale, is
inherent to IPRs and a necessity in bringing about legal certainty in downstream
markets).
22. Hector L. MacQueen, International Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights. A
2014]1 231
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market, the right-holder can no longer influence further transfer of
the product on the market by legal means; the right-holder's rights
have been "exhausted."2 Exhaustion of IPRs only relates to the right
to control the resale of the protected product after first sale by means
of IPRs. It does not affect the existence and exercise of rights in
respect to all actions taken without the consent of the right-holder,
such as counterfeiting, piracy, the use of a patented invention, or the
24confusing use of a trademark. In other words, exhaustion does not
affect the core and essence of an IPR.
TRIPS addresses the issue of parallel trade on two levels. The
first relates to the problem of exhaustion of rights. The second
relates to the notion and scope of individual IPRs, in particular to
trademarks and patents. Regarding the first, Article 6 of TRIPS
constitutes an "agreement to disagree." Members remain free to
adopt national, international, or regional exhaustion, as long as the
decision is made on a nondiscriminatory basis.
However, considering the doctrine of exhaustion and its different
forms, the issue of parallel trade is not exclusively defined by Article
6. It may also be resolved independently of exhaustion, i.e., before
the question of exhaustion even arises. This is the case that concerns
25trademarks. As a minimum standard, Article 16:1 of TRIPS grants
the exclusive right to prevent third parties from using "identical or
similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to
those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use
would result in a likelihood of confusion." 26
Article 16:1 primarily applies to counterfeit goods but is also
relevant to parallel trade. The provision creates a presumption of
likelihood of confusion in the case of identical marks used on
identical goods or services. Demonstrating an absence of confusion,
which is crucial to parallel trade cases, can rebut the presumed
Scottish Contribution to the Debate, 4(4) INTELL. PROP. Q. 357, 357-66 (2000).
23. DAVID T. KEELING, INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EU LAW VOLUME I
FREE MOVEMENT AND COMPETITION LAW 75 (2003).
24. Avgoustis, supra note 19, at 108-21 (arguing the implementation of a specific
exhaustion model would be preferable).
2 5. Id.
26. For further discussion of TRIPS negative formulation of the nature of trade
mark rights issues, see Tania Voon & Andrew Mitchell, Face Off Assessing WTO
Challenges to Australa's Scheme for Plain Tobacco Packaging, 22(3) PUB. L. REV.
218 (2011).
27. The "likelihood of confusion" standard is one familiar to all United States
232 [Vol. 37:2
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confusion 8 The importer of parallel-traded goods, originating from
different production lines in different countries but controlled by the
same firm and right-holder, will generally be able to show that such
likeliness of confusion does not exist. Whether imported products
can be prevented from being put on the market depends on the test of
consumer confusion. To the extent that products are identical and of
equal quality, the concept of trademark protection in TRIPS does not
allow the ban of parallel imports. Conceptually, the question of
exhaustion does not even arise and the qualifications of Article 6 of
TRIPS (and the footnote to Article 28:1) are irrelevant with respect
to assessing parallel trade in the field of trademarks. As a result, the
minimum standard is equivalent to a regime of international
-29exhaustion.
B. Enforcement at the Time of Acquisition and/or Maintenance
Part III of TRIPS sets forth detailed national-level procedures
and remedies that provide for the effective enforcement of IPRs.30
Part IV sets out procedural standards that relate to the registration
31and maintenance of rights.
trademark practitioners. The Paris Convention discusses likelihood of confusion
only in the context of well-known marks (Article 6bis), but §2(d) of the Lanham Act,
15 USC §1052(d), generally bars registration of a mark "which so resembles a mark
registered in the PTO, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States
by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with
the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ...."
The court in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973),
listed the principal factors to be considered in determining whether there is a
likelihood of confusion under §2(d). See In re August Storck KG, 218 U.S.P.Q. 823
(T.T.A.B. 1983); In re Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. 910 (T.T.A.B. 1978);
Guardian Products Co. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 U.S.P.Q. 738 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
28. Jeroen Van Hezeijk, Montex and Rolex - Irreconcilable differences? A Call
for a Better Definition of Counterfeit Goods, 39 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 775, 776, 794 (2008).
29. The impact of Article 16, however, is not mandatory and applies only in
jurisdictions where national or regional law does not grant protection beyond the
minimum standard required by Article 1:1 of TRIPS. Members are free to adopt
levels of protection that go beyond the test of consumer deception and to exclude
external parallel trade as a matter of principle.
30. Xavier Seuba, Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Products 11 (Int'l Ctr. Trade &
Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper 27, March 2010), available at http://ictsd.org/downl
oads/2011/12/free-trade-of-pharmaceutical-products.pdf.
31. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyight Order: Why National Courts
Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 503-18 (2000). See also
Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global Intellectual
Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861, 863-64, 871, 889-90 (2009).
2332014]
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Most actions for unlawful importation and distribution by way of
parallel trade are settled by core provisions of TRIPS, such as Article
50, and do not reach the stage of ordinary and costly proceedings.
The powers granted in Article 50 are of particular importance for
trademark and copyright enforcement in the field of software
protection because infringements can be easily deleted upon notice of
32impending measures.
III. Protecting Trademark to Attract Foreign Investment
The purpose of TRIPS is to provide minimum standards of IP
protection, with members having flexibility to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within
their own legal systems.33 TRIPS attempts to reduce the differences
in the manner by which IPRs are protected around the world by
fixing a minimum level of IPR protection that each of the WTO's
member states ought to guarantee. Even if not directly related to
investment, TRIPS has an impact on the level of investment in a
country.34 To that extent, the question must be asked: Is there a
negative impact of compulsory licensing on investment decisions?
A. Protecting Trademark to Attract Foreign Investors
Article 7 of TRIPS emphasizes the protection of foreign
investment by protection of technology, but TRIPS per se does not
contain any provisions on investment. The relationship between
TRIPS and foreign investment is also evident from the fact that
virtually all modern IlAs, which lay down standards for the
promotion and protection of foreign investment, include intellectual
property within the definition of investment. 35 In addition, the
32. Kanaan Al-Ahmar, Intellectual Property Rights in Yemen: Proposals for
Reforming the Legal Statutes and the Enforcement of Procedures, 34(4) INT'L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 373, 373-403 (2003).
33. Peter Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous.
L. REV. 979 (2009).
34. See Julien Chaisse and Christian Bellak, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties
Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Preliminary Reflections on a New Methodology
3(4) TRANSNAT'L CORP. REV. 3-11 (2011).
35. Rachel A. Lavery, Coverage of Intellectual Property Rights in International
Investment Agreements: An Empirical Analysis of Definitions in a Sample of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Free Trade Agreements, 6(2) TRANSNAT'L DIsP.
MGMT. (2009), available at http://www.transnational-dispute
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existence of certain standards of IPR protection should be one of the
elements potential foreign investors should take into consideration
when deciding where to locate their production facilities. However,
in the long term, to the extent that the levels of protection are
substantially harmonized under TRIPS, IPRs are likely to become a
less significant issue in investment decisions, except with respect to
the effective enforcement of available rights.
Therefore, the question arises as to the relationship between
IAs and agreements like TRIPS with respect to IPRs. While the
former contain provisions that can apply to IPRs (as is shown in part
V), the latter contains specific rights and obligations.
B. Litigation on Trademark at the WTO
Dispute settlement at the WTO is an ongoing and important
process. 6 Unlike multilateral trade rounds, it does not depend on the
dynamics of the political process, and members are free to bring their
problems before panels and the Appellate Body independent of
ongoing negotiations. With such a dispute settlement system, a major
part of the work in the WTO no longer depends on the fate of trade
rounds. Nevertheless, a close connection remains. Members may be
willing to test the waters more readily in between rounds or during
stalemates, and seek to solve systemic problems by recourse to the
judicial branch of the organization. The first years of this new system
produced important leading cases. Then again, members may be
more reluctant to bring cases when negotiations are in full swing.
While dispute settlement should not be considered an unfriendly act,
pending cases may influence the climate of negotiations and the
prospects of finding an agreement. Moreover, many delegations
operate with scarce resources and refrain from dispute settlement for
such reasons. Overall, however, the two branches peacefully operate
37in tandem.
management.com/article.asp?key=1448.
36. See Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO's Supremacy
in the International Trade Order - A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 J. INT'L ECON. L. 9 (2013)
37. See Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, Some Reflections on the WTO Dispute
Settlement System from a Practitioner's Perspective, 4(1) J. INT'L ECON. L. 145
(2001); James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Pinciples of International Law in the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 50(2) INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 248 (2001); DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (James Cameron & Karen
Campbell eds., 1998).
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Between 1995 and 2013, nine claims relating to trademark have
been filed to the WTO, provided in Table 1. This is a relatively
significant number, it being understood that many other claims
touched upon other IPR issues.
Table 1. Trademark Disputes at the WTO
DS59 Indonesia - Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile
Industry (Complainant: United States)
DSl74 European Communities - Protection
of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products
and Foodstuffs (Complainant: United
States)
8 October 1996 1 Panel report, 23
July 1998
1 June 1999













to modify 4 times
(first. 30 June 2003,
then, 31 December
2003, 31 December
2004 and, finally, 30
June 2005) the
reasonable period of




and rulings of the
DSB
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DS362 China - Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights
(Complainant: United States)
DS434 Australia - Certain Measures
Concerning Trademarks and Other
Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging (Complainant: Ukraine)
DS435 Australia - Certain Measures
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging (Complainant:
Honduras)
DS441 Australia - Certain Measures
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging (Complainant:
Dominican Republic)
DS458 Australia - Certain Measures
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging (Complainant:
Cuba)
DS467 Australia - Certain Measures
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging (Complainant:
Indonesia)
10 April 2007 / Panel report, 26
January 2009
















Source: WTO database of trade disputes (as of October 17, 2013)
Importantly, five claims have been filed against Australia since
2012 and all deal with the law on plain packaging. While these cases
are still pending at the time of writing, it is clear that the issue of
trademark infringement is very much alive and raises thorny issues.
Beyond the Australian case, four other cases dealt with trademark at
the WTO. The first was Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry case that was initiated by the US and resulted in
a panel report in 1998.38 The second was the European Communities
38. Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998).
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- Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, which was again initiated by the
United States and led to a panel report in 2005. The third was the
widely commented upon" case, China - Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, again
brought by the United States and decided by a panel report in 2009.41
These three cases were all settled by a panel report. The fourth case,
The United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998,42 was far more difficult; it took almost seven years to reach
proper settlement and the panel report is still not fully implemented as
of 2013.43 This case is the best illustration of trademark protection
under TRIPS.
IV. Revisiting the "Havana Club" Dispute
In the United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act
of 1998 case," the European Communities challenged a provision of
United States law denying protection to the owners of Cuban
39. Panel Report, European Communities - Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs - Complaint by
the United States - WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005).
40. Panel Report, China - Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009). See Donald P. Harris,
The Honeymoon is Over: The US. China WTO Intellectual Property Complaint, 32
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 96, 103 (2009). See also Brian Fitzgerald & Lucy Montgomery,
Copyright and the Creative Industries in China, 9 INT'L J. CULTURAL STUD. 407, 408
(2006) (supporting the proposition that Confucianism strongly encouraged the
imitation of teachers as a way of learning).
41. See James Mendenhall, WTO Panel Report on Consistency of Chinese
Intellectual Property Standards, 13(4) AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. INSIGHT (Apr. 3, 2009),
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/13/issue/4/wto-panel-report-consistency-chinese
intellectual-property-standards; and Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute,
89(4) NEB. L. REV. 1046 (2010).
42. Havana Club, supra note 15.
43. Status Report by the United States Add., United States - Section 211
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/11/Add.130 (Sept. 13, 2013).
Meanwhile, the dispute generated six U.S. court decisions. See Havana Club
Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 961 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Havana Club
Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 974 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Havana Club
Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., No. 96 CIV. 9655(SAS), 1998 WL 150983 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 1998); Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1085
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 918 (2000). For a commentary on these domestic
developments, see Emily Taylor, The Havana Club Saga: Threatening More Than
Just "CUBA COKE" 24(2) Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 513 (2004).
44. Havana Club, supra note 15.
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trademarks and trade names that had been connected to businesses
confiscated by the Cuban government during the Cuban revolution.4 5
Below, we argue that the WTO's decision to end this dispute resolved
investment questions arising out of the global administration of IPRs.
A. The Trademark Owner, the Foreign Investor and TRIPS
This section presents a brief overview of the Omnibus
Appropriations Case and the possible implications of the case to future
investment cases on the protection of IPRs. A Cuban family that
produced rum owned the trademark "Havana Club," which was
registered both in Cuba and the United States. After the Cuban
revolution, the business was expropriated and a Cuban government-
owned enterprise registered the "Havana-Club" trademark in Cuba and
the United States. In the early 1990s, the Cuban state enterprise entered
into a joint venture with the French liquor distributor Pernod Ricard,
thereby constituting the Havana-Club-Holding (HCH). In 1997, the
U.S. enterprise Bacardi purchased the residual trademark rights of the
Cuban family who initially registered the trademark. After Bacardi's
successful legislative effort, the U.S. Congress enacted Section 211 in the
Omnibus Appropriations Act, which deprived the HCH of all its rights
from the registered "Havana-Club" trademark in the United States.
HCH was deprived of the enforcement of the trademark before the
national courts, the assignment of the trademark was retroactively
denied effect, and the possibility to renew registration was excluded.
The European Communities (EC) filed a complaint against the
United States with the WTO, alleging that Section 211 of the Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998 ("Section 211") violated inter alia Article
3.1 and 4 of TRIPS that deals with NT and MiFN respectively.46 The
WTO Panel held that Section 211 was in violation of Article 42 of
TRIPS as it denied trademark owners access to courts. However, it did
not agree with the EC on Article 3.1 and 4 as it held that TRIPS does
45. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing A Global
Intellectual Property System Responsive To Change: The WTO, WIPO, And
BEYOND, 46 Hous. L. REV. 1187 (2009).
46. Panel Report, United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, WT/DS176/R, (Aug. 6, 2001), at 8.6-8.10. The EU claimed that § 211 violated
the registration, enforcement, and National Treatment and Most Favored Nation
Treatment requirements of TRIPS : that § 211(a)(1) violated Articles 2.1 and 15.1 of
TRIPS and Article 6 quinquies (A)(1) of the Paris Convention; that § 211 (a)(2)
violated Articles 2.1, 3.1, 4, 16.1, and 42 of TRIPS and Articles 2(1), 6bis, and 8 of
the Paris Convention; and that § 211(b) violated Articles 2.1, 3.1, 4, 16.1, and 42 of
TRIPS and Articles 2(1), 6bis, and 8 of the Paris Convention.
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not deal with trade names and ownership of IPRs. The EC appealed
this decision.
The impugned sections of the Omnibus Appropriations Act in
this case were Section 211(a) (2) and 211 (b). Section 211(a)(2)
provides that if a business and its mark have been confiscated and a
designated national tries to assert rights against another mark, that is
the same as or substantially similar to such a confiscated mark, the
U.S. courts shall not in any way validate such an assertion of rights.47
Section 211 (b) states that if a business and its mark have been
confiscated and a designated national or its successor-in-interest tries
to assert rights, based on certain treaty rights, of a trademark being
the same as or substantially similar to such a confiscated mark, then
U.S. courts shall not in any way validate such an assertion of rights.4
The two Sections in question deal basically with the same
situations except for two differences: Section (a) (2) concerns the
assertion of rights based on common law rights or registration, whereas
Section 211 (b) only deals with treaty rights. The second difference is
more significant: whereas Section 211 (a) (2) concerns only Cuban
original owners and foreign successors-in-interest, Section 211 (b)
concerns Cuban original owners ("Original owner level") as well as
successors-in-interest ("Successor in interest level") of any nationality,
including Americans. The EC alleged that the unfavorable treatment
to foreign nationals constituted a violation of the NT and MFN
principles.
According to Article 3.1 of TRIPS, the NT principle requires
WTO member states to accord no less favorable treatment to
nonnationals than to nationals with respect to the protection of trade-
related property rights. Protection is understood as "matters
affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and
enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as those matters
affecting the use of intellectual property rights specifically
47. However, the European Communities argued that it had not been
demonstrated by the United States that this treatment in each and every factual
situation necessarily and fully compensated for the discrimination created by Section
211 (a) (2).
48. Read together with Section 211 (d) in conjunction with the Sections 515.336
and 515.305 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 211 (b) applies in
simplified terms to Cuban original owners and any successors-in-interest trying to
assert rights of a United States trademark which is the same as or substantially




addressed." 49 Article 4 of TRIPS contains the MIFN clause forbidding
any discriminatory treatment between nationals of different foreign
countries. Thus, if a member state grants a favor to a foreign
national, that member state has to accord the same favor immediately
and unconditionally to the nationals of all other member states.
MFN and NT are basic principles on which modern investment
laws are built. The issues that were addressed in the HCH case are
similar to those that confront the treatment of IPRs as an investment
in IIAs. By enacting Section 211, the U.S. Government's actions can
be interpreted as indirect expropriation.50 If there existed a Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT) between the United States and Cuba, HCH
could have submitted the dispute to an arbitral tribunal. The
adjudication by the WTO Appellate authority is representative of the
possible overlap of jurisdiction in future cases.
There are two groups of persons that could be discriminated
against under Section 211 (a) (2) and (b) with respect to both Article
3.1 and Article 4 of TRIPS: successors-in-interest and original owners.
Therefore the following discussion will present the inconsistency of
Section 211 (a) (2) and (b) with respect to Articles 3.1 and 4 of TRIPS
as they apply to successors-in-interest and original owners.
B. Level of Successors-in-Interest
The EC, in its WTO complaint against the United States
regarding the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 first argued that
Section 211 (a) (2) is prima facie discriminatory, as US nationals
would never fall within its scope. Therefore, EC argued that Section
211 (a) (2) imposes restrictions on Cubans and other foreign nationals
that it does not impose on U.S. nationals.51 Second, the EC
contended that there would be no counterbalance of this
49. TRIPS, supra note 2 at Article 3.1.
50. Since none of the three criteria listed by Correa are satisfied, and it is a clear
violation of FET. See infra part VII and accompany text for a discussion on FET
and Correa's criteria. See also, Carlos M. Correa, Bilateral Investment Agreements:
Agents of new Global Standards for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights?,
GRAIN (Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.grain.orglarticle/entries/125-bilateral-investment-
agreements-agents-of-new-global-standards-for-the-protection-of-intellectual-
property-rights.
51. As a consequence, a United States national who is a successor-in-interest to a
designated national could have, in contrast to a non-United States-national, United
States courts recognize, enforce or validate his rights in respect of the underlying
mark that was registered pursuant to a specific license granted by Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC).
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discrimination by Cuba's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC),
which administers the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR). 2
Finally, even if the United States was able to prove such an offsetting
effect, it would remain discriminatory because of the different
number of "hurdles" to which different successors-in-interest are
exposed. The United States argued that the prima facie
discrimination of Section 211 (a) (2) could be offset by the consistent
practice of the OFAC. OFAC regulations were very broad and
affected every nationality, not only Cubans. The United States also
contended that OFAC had never issued a specific license to a U.S.
national for the purpose of becoming a successor-in-interest to
trademarks that were used in connection with confiscated assets.53
The United States believed that in repeating the arguments that it
had raised before the Panel, the EC had not taken into account the
decisive difference between the two Sections: whereas Section 211 (a)
(2) only applies to any foreign successors-in-interest, Section 211 (b)
applies to all successors-in-interest including U.S. nationals.







Source: Elaboration by the Authors
52. The European Communities argued that it had not been demonstrated by the
United States that this treatment in each and every factual situation necessarily and
fully compensated the discrimination created by Section 211 (a) (2).
53. Although OFAC has the discretion to issue such licenses, it will not do it in
the future, because as an agency of the executive branch it will not violate any
international obligations. Moreover, even if a United States national was granted
such a license, the United States courts would apply the longstanding principle
against the recognition of foreign confiscations, which would constitute a second









The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding and stated that
Section 211 (a) (2) is inconsistent with Art 3.1.5 The Appellate Body
held that a possibility of preferential treatment (formal differences in
procedures) constituted sufficient discrimination, which fulfilled the
criterion of inconsistency with the NT clause. The Appellate Body
rejected the U.S. argument that under the "non-recognition of
foreign confiscation" doctrine,s no U.S. court would enforce the
rights of successors-in-interest. Such a doctrine would apply both to
nationals and non-nationals and therefore could not offset the
discrimination in Section 211(a) (1), but instead would construct a
third hurdle for nonnationals. The Appellate Body summarily upheld
the Panel's finding that agreed with the U.S. position that there was
obviously no violation of Art 3.1 in respect of Section 211 (a) (2). On
the other hand, Section 211 (b) expressly used the wording
"successors-in-interest of any nationality," thus including US
nationals, and therefore prevented differential treatment of U.S. and
non-U.S. nationals. The United States originally argued that the
effect of this language (preventing differential treatment) was not a
violation of Art 3.1. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel finding
that agreed with the U.S. argument.
C. Level of Original Owners
The EC argued that the Panel erred in its conclusion about
discrimination among original owners. They claimed that both
Sections 211(a)(2) and 211(b) violated the NT obligation under
TRIPS by relying on a particular set of circumstances, which
according to them illustrated that Sections 211(a)(2) and (b) were
prima fade discriminatory, and asked the Appellate Body to consider
this specific situation.56 The EC claimed that in this situation, the
54. See Havana Club, supra note 15, at para. 296.
55. Id., at 266-68.
56. Id., at para. 280: "There are two separate owners who acquired rights, either
at common law or based on registration, in two separate United States trademarks,
before the Cuban confiscation occurred. Each of these two United States
trademarks is the same, or substantially similar to, the signs or combination of signs
of which a trademark registered in Cuba is composed. That same or similar Cuban
trademark was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated in
Cuba. Neither of the two original owners of the two United States trademarks was
the owner of that same or similar trademark that was registered in Cuba. Those two
original owners each seek to assert rights in the United States in their two respective
United States trademarks. The situation of these two original owners of these two
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original owner, who is a Cuban national, is subject to
Sections 211(a)(2) and (b), while original owners who are U.S
.nationals or non-Cuban nationals are not. Thereby Cubans were
treated less favorably than non-Cubans. The United States claimed
that Sections 211(a) (2) and (b) would not be applicable to original
owners, regardless of their nationality, because original owners were
always in a position to consent expressly to their own assertion of
rights under the impugned Sections. The United States also claimed
that Section 211(a)(2) did not apply to Cuban nationals in the
situation posed by the EC because Section 515.527 of the CACR was
not in effect when the original owners in this situation obtained their
trademark rights in the United States.





Source: Elaboration by the Authors
United States trademarks is identical in every relevant respect, but one. That one
difference is this: One original owner is a national of Cuba, and the other original
owner is a national of the United States [or as concerns Article 4, a non-Cuban
foreigner who is an original owner] "
57. For trademark rights based on common law, the United States contended
that the Cuban original owner could not have maintained his rights in the United
States trademark because he would not have been able to import the trademarked
goods from Cuba and, thus, would not have been able to continue using the
trademark "in commerce." Further, the US argued that the Cuban original owner
could be "unblocked" under the OFAC regulations, and thereby would have the
same status as a United States national, which would offset a discriminatory
treatment. The CACR contained provisions that would result in exceptions for
Cuban nationals from discriminatory treatment as well as provisions that would
provide equally onerous treatment to United States nationals or non-Cuban nationals
and thereby offset the less favorable treatment of the Cuban nationals that otherwise











The Appellate Body agreed with the EC that the specific
situation, which the EC asked the Appellate Body to consider, was
critical to the determination of inconsistency of the Sections with the
Articles 3.1 and 4. The Appellate Body held that since the EC had
established a prima facie case of discrimination inconsistent with
Article 3.1 and 4 of TRIPS, the United States would only be able to
rebut that finding by proving that discrimination against Cuban
nationals would never occur in practice. The Appellate Body thus
required that the discriminatory treatment must be excluded in every
case. The United States was not able to satisfy that standard.
Accordingly, the Appellate Body concluded that at the Original
Owner level, Sections 211 (a) (2) and (b) were inconsistent with
Article 3.1's NT and Article 4's MFN as well.
D. Lessons from the "Havana Club"
In summary, the Appellate Body concluded that because the
Sections 211 (a) (2) and (b) prima facie provided less favorable
procedural treatment to Cubans than to U.S. nationals and non-
Cuban foreigners, the United States must prove that discriminatory
treatment arising from those sections was excluded in every case, not
just on average. Accordingly, the Appellate Body almost completely
reversed the Panel's findings with respect to Articles 3.1 and 4. The
only portion of the Panel's findings that the Appellate body upheld
58. A Cuban original owner of an United States trademark is not always in a
position to consent expressly to his assertion of rights, because he is not necessarily
the same person as the original owner of the same or substantially similar Cuban
trademark used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated, and he
would thus be unable to express his own consent to avoid the United States court's
denial of assertion of rights. In a case where the Cuban who is an original owner of
trademark rights in the United States based on common law, and not registration, or
he seeks a renewal of a registered trademark, Section 211 (a) (2) would apply and
accordingly discriminate against him. Furthermore a Cuban national who possessed
trademark rights based on common law could have been able to import the
trademarked goods and been able to use them "in commerce" when he imported the
goods from a country other than Cuba, which was a possible scenario. The
agreement of the United States that Cuban original owners could be "unblocked"
under the OFAC regulations did not persuade the Appellate Body because the less
favorable treatment was not proved by the United States to be excluded in every
individual situation. Similarly the United States was not able to show that a
discrimination would be offset in every case by the fact that Section 515.201 of the
CACR as well as the application of the doctrine of nonrecognition of foreign
confiscations could apply to United States nationals or non-Cuban nationals in an
onerous manner, thereby offsetting the less favorable treatment of the Cuban
original owner according to Section 211 (a) (2) and (b).
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was the conclusion that Section 211 (b) 59 was consistent with TRIPS
Art 3.1. The "Havana Club Case" was the first case in which the
Appellate Body had to deal with TRIPS Art 3.1. The Appellate Body
stressed the importance of the fundamental principle of the world
trading system, i.e., of the obligation of NT--especially in its
concluding remarks.6 0
As shown in part IV sections B and C above, the report of the
Appellate Body in this case remains consistent with the decision of
the panel in the Section 337 Case,61 which suggests that in the future,
both GATT 1994 and TRIPS will be consistently interpreted. The
question may arise as to whether the standard laid down with respect
to NT and MFN by the Appellate Body is too rigorous. Articles 3.1
and 4 of TRIPS apply to de facto discrimination, a standard important
in cases where legislation is not discriminatory on its face. Where,
such as in this case, the legislation is discriminatory on its face, the
presumption of an existence of discrimination should be very strong.
It would be strange if a violation of the principles was excluded
because the legislation did not discriminate more often than not.
Furthermore, a discriminatory legislation in itself could be regarded
as onerous in the area where the principles of NT and MFN apply;
therefore, a rigorous assessment and very high standard of proof
would be justified.
One conclusion that could be drawn concerning the fact that the
Appellate Body nearly reversed the Panel's findings in its entirety is
that the Panel was decided in a political manner, whereas the
Appellate Body strictly adhered to the legal basis of TRIPS.
59. Because of the clear wording of § 211(b) it was rather obvious that there was
no discrimination between US nationals and foreign nationals.
60. For further commentary on the effects of § 211 and the AB decision on
international intellectual property rights and the Cuban embargo, see Robert
Dufresne, Assessing Clashes and Interplays of Regimes from a Distributive
Perspective: IP Rights Under the Strengthening Embargo against Cuba and the
Agreement on TRIPS, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 767, 768-69 (2003).
61. United States - Section 337 of the Tanf Act of 1930 and Amendments
thereto, DS/186. The case related to Section 337 of the U.S Tariff Act brought by the
EC against the US based on GATT Article 3 and TRIPS.
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V. Emerging Role of Investment Treaties to Protect
Trademark
Governments around the world have realized the importance of
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in pursuing the economic growth of
their countries.62 There is intense competition among states,
particularly amongst developing states, to attract greater FDI. This
competition forces countries to create a secure and stable investment
environment for prospective investors.63 In order to create such an
environment, states are entering into BITs or other HAs, which can
provide a legal framework for granting protection to foreign
investors.6 Foreign investors are guaranteed a certain standard of
protection or treatment by a host country under a BIT. BITs provide
certain guarantees, which either provide foreign investors with specific
protections and/or set forth rules regarding how host nations will treat
65the foreign investors. Some classical standards of treatment provided
in BITs are non-Expropriation, MFN, National Treatment, and Fair
and Equitable Treatment (FET). Apart from a set of standards
granted to foreign investors, most BITs provide a dispute settlement
mechanism allowing foreign investors to have access to international
62. Alexander J. Belohlavek and Filip Cerny, Law Applicable to Claims
Asserted in International In vestment Disputes, 54(6) INT'L J. OF LAW & MGMT. 443
(2012).
63. See Julien Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on
Foreign Investment - How will the New EU Competence on FDI Affect the
Emerging Global Regime 15(1) J. INT'L ECON. L. 51 (2012).
64. Unfortunately, as of today, we do not have any comprehensive multilateral
agreement on investment either under the ambit of WTO or anywhere else. Under
WTO's Doha Development Agenda, originally the possibility of negotiations on
investment was included in 2001 but it was dropped in 2004. There was a prior
attempt to negotiate a Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA) among OECD
countries as a plurilateral agreement, but these negotiations ended without success in
1997. Hence international rules on investment are fragmented and there is a wide
variety of obligations. See Margot E. Salomon, From NIEO to Now and The
Unfinishable Story of Economic Justice, 62(1) IN" L & COMP. L.O. 31, 43 (2013)
(explaining that, "[h]istorically, the aim of BITs has been to strengthen the protection
afforded foreign investors, especially in developing and transitional markets, in
return for increased inward foreign investment flows.").
65. International investment law provides rules to ensure access for foreign
investment to host country markets and protect investment against risk (especially
political risk). It creates a specific set of investment protection obligations on host
countries, including protection against expropriation without compensation and gives
access to financial compensation through investor-state arbitration where the host
country breaches a protection obligation. See SANTIAGO MONTr, STATE LIABILITY
IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE BIT
GENERATION, 302-204 (Hart Publishing 2009).
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tribunals when they are not satisfied with the host nation's treatment.66
The WTO and its predecessor organization, GATT 1994, have not
directly tackled the broad issue of foreign investment rules. Instead,
GATT 1994 and the WTO have dealt with a narrow set of issues, which
has left nations to formulate their own policies, either through BITs or
other IIAs.
Foreign investment plays an extraordinary and growing role in
global business. It can provide a firm with new markets and
marketing channels, cheaper production facilities, and access to new
technology, products, skills, and financing. For a host country that
receives the investment, it can provide a source of new technologies,
capital, processes, products, organizational technologies, and
management skills, and as such can provide a strong impetus to
economic development. Trademark protection may bring capital to a
country while the trademark itself, although intangible, is a form of
67foreign investment.
Over the last few decades, there has been a marked shift towards a
knowledge-based global economy. This means that any country that
hopes to attract FDI must have strong domestic IPR protection. Given
the minimal protection offered by TRIPS and weak enforcement
mechanisms for IPR violations in developing countries, an argument is
being made for stronger "TRIPS plus" protection. Since intellectual
68property has been widely recognized as an investment in IIAs, it has
been suggested that allowing IPR claims against host states could
strengthen the existing IPR protection. In the early 2000s,
International Arbitration drew the attention of experts to the role that
IIAs could play in regard to trademarks and, more broadly, to IPRs.
66. Regarding arbitration under HAs, there have been 471 known cases as of
October 10, 2013. The majority of cases (more than 60%) emerged after 2004, with
46 claims in the last year alone. About 90% of cases are from investors of developed
countries against developing countries. Out of 450 cases, 220 have concluded prior to
October 10, 2013, with 26 concluded only in 2011. Of the decisions 40% were in
favor of host country, while 30% were in favor of investors and 30% cases settled.
See Julien Chaisse, Assessing the Exposure of Asian States to Investment Claims
6(2) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 187-225 (2013).
67. Jean R. Homere, Intellectual Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the
Economic Development of Least Developed Countries, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 277,
277 (2004); Amir Khoury, Trademark Policy: The Case of Arab Countries, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 299, 300 (Daniel Gervais ed.,
2007).
68. For an empirical survey of the coverage of IPRs in Investement Agreements
see Lavery, supra note 35.
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Wena Hotels v. f ypt found that expropriation should not be limited
to tangible rights. More recently, the Pey Casado v. Chile awardo
stated that the BIT defined "investments" as various forms of holdings,
such as goods and rights of all types, acquired by way of legislation
from the country receiving the investment and more specifically, albeit
not limited to: shares and other holdings enabling participation in
companies; credits, securities and contributions held with the intent of
deriving increased economic benefit; all moveable and immovable
goods, including all ensuing, derived rights; all rights derived from
intellectual property; and, rights put into operation by way of the law
or contracts, resulting from the commercial and economic development
of prospecting, cultural endeavors, or natural resource extraction.
A. Defining Trademark as a Form of In vestment
The subject matter of an IIA is determined by the definition of
the term "investment" together with that of "investor." The concept
of investment governs the assets that fall under the scope of
application of the agreement. In other words, it answers the question
of what types of investments are covered.7 2 Traditionally aimed at
investment protection, most BITs define "investment" in a broad and
open-ended manner covering not only the capital that has crossed
borders, but also practically all other kinds of assets of an investor in
the territory of the host country. The Millicom v. Senegal Decision
on Jurisdiction notes that the BIT's definition of investment is
"extremely broad." 73
A detailed observation shows that there are four distinct
approaches to the definition of investment in BITs. First, there is the
traditional "asset-based" definition,74 which, with variations, is the
69. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4,
Award, 98 (Dec. 8, 2000).
70. Victor Pey Casado v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Award
(May 8, 2008).
71. Id. at $ 366-379.
72. For a comprehensive analysis of the definitions of "investment," see UNITED
NATIONS TRADE CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES 1995-1996: TRENDS IN INVESTMENT RULEMAKING, U.N. Doc.
UNTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5, U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.16 (2007).
73. Millicom Int'l Operations B.V. v. The Republic of Senegal, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/20, Decision on Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, at 79 (July 16,2010).
74. Anne Van Aaken, Perils of Success? The Case of International Investment
Protection, 9(1) EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) (noting that "[a]sset-based
definitions usually include all tangible and intangible assets, debt, contractual claims
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most common approach. Second, the use of which has diminished
over the last few years, is a "circular" or "tautological" approach,
which focuses on the features of an investment rather than
conceptualizing it.75 Third, is the "closed-list" definition of
investment7 and the fourth approach is to exclude certain assets and
transactions from the definition.
and intellectual property rights, including, for example, promissory notes or bank
loans. This broad definition thus differs from the classical definition of FDI, which
usually requires a long-term investment controlled by a foreigner who assumes a
certain risk.").
75. Definition of "investment" can be flexible enough to apply to new types of
investment that might emerge in the future. Numerous BITs concluded by the
United States illustrate this approach, such as the BIT with Bahrain. Bahrain
Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Bahrain, art. 1, December 29, 1999, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 106-25 (It defines an "investment" as "every kind of investment" and not only
"every kind of asset.'). This tautological approach is virtually limited to US BITs.
76. The third approach that has emerged to avoid an excessively broad definition
of "investment" is what is called a "closed-list" definition. It consists of an ample,
but finite list of tangible and intangible assets. Originally envisaged as an
"enterprise-based" definition used in the context of USA-Canada FTA, this
approach evolved towards the definition used in Article 1139 of NAFTA. It has been
incorporated into the 2004 Canadian BIT model. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT CANADA, Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement
(FIPAs), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/what-fipa-en.asp#structure (last
updated March 11, 2014).
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The traditional "asset-based" definition can be found in the China-
Uganda BIT (2004):
Article 1. The term "investment" means every kind of property, such as
goods, rights and interests of whatever nature, and in particular, though
not exclusively, includes: (a) tangible, intangible, movable and immovable
propely [property?] as well as any other right in rem such as mortgages,
liens, usufructs, pledges and similar rights; (b) shares, debentures, stock
and any other kind of participation in companies; (c) claims to money or to
any other performance having an economic value associated with an
investment; (d) intellectual and industrial property rights such as
copyrights, patents, trademarks, industrial models and mockups, technical
processes, know-how, trade names and goodwill, and any other similar
rights; and (e) business concessions conferred by law or under contract,
including concessions to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural
resources.
The "closed-list" definition of investment as in the Canada's FIPA
model:77
"[I]nvestment means: (I) an enterprise; (II) an equity security of an
enterprise; (III) a debt security of an enterprise (i) where the enterprise
is an affiliate of the investor, or (ii) where the original maturity of the debt
security is at least three years, but does not include a debt security,
regardless of original maturity, of a state enterprise; (IV) a loan to an
enterprise (i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or (ii)
where the original maturity of the loan is at least three years, but does not
include a loan, regardless of original maturity, to a state enterprise."
As is evident from above, the traditional "asset based" definition
in the China-Uganda BIT explicitly recognizes IPRs as an
investment. Even the closed list model sometimes contains explicit
78
recognition of IPRs. This sort of explicit recognition can be seen in
77. The revised FIPA now lists IPR as an investment; see Lahra Liberti,
Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment Agreements 1, 4 (OECD
Working Papers on International Investment No. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/ internationalinvestmentagreements/44822901.pdf.
78. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
People's Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
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most IIAs.79 It has been argued that even in the models that do not
explicitly recognize IPRs, it can be assumed that IPRs are an
investment through provisions that protect investor "returns" or
within the definition of an asset.8 For instance, consider the Japan-
Mexico FTA which does not explicitly include IPRs as an investment
but specifically covers "real estate or other property, tangible or
intangible, and any related property rights such as lease, liens and
pledges, acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of
economic benefit or other business purposes. '$1
IPRs would fall under this definition as they are intangible assets
used for economic benefit. The conceptual problem in recognizing
IPRs as an investment in BITs is that it is an intangible asset, unlike
physical goods that can be taken possession of by a state via
expropriation.82 However, in the case of Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab
Republic of Egypt,8 the tribunal found that expropriation is not
limited to tangible property rights. The tribunal relied on the case of
SPP v. Arab Republic of Egypt," which held that it was an accepted
principle in international law that intangible contractual rights could
also be subject to expropriation. In the same vein, the Amco
International Finance Corp v. IranS5 Tribunal stated that,
"Expropriation, which can be defined as a compulsory transfer of
property ights, may extend to any right which can be the object of a
commercial transaction." Also, the Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v.
Iran Tribunal further explained that "whether the expropriation is
formal or de facto and whether the property is tangible, such as real
estate or a factory, or intangible, such as the contractual nghts
79. Lavery, supra note 35.
80. Bryan Mercurio, The Untapped Potential of Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Involving Intellectual Property Rights and Expropriation in Free Trade
Agreements 1, 4 (Chinese University, CFRED Working Paper, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/ab stract=1806822.
81. Agreement Between Japan and The United Mexican States For The
Strengthening of the Economic Partnership, Japan-Mex., September 17, 2004,
JOYAKU WEB, art 96(i)(GG) (Japan), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/a greement/agreement.pdf.
82. Bryan Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights
in InternationalInvestment Agreements, 15(3) J. INT'L ECON. L. 871, 901-02 (2012).
83. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4
(Feb. 5, 2002). 41 ILM 896 (2002).
84. ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, (Dec. 8, 2000).
85. Amco Int'l Fin. Corp v. Iran, 15 Iran-US C.T.R., at para 166.
86. Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Iran, 21 Iran-US C.T.R. at para 167.
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involved in the present Case,"87 it does not call into question the
applicability of the expropriation clause to the case. Also, the White
v. India Final Award, citing Phillips Petroleum, held that contractual
rights, whether tangible or intangible, are capable of being
expropriated.
Thus, it is a well-accepted proposition that intangible rights can
also be expropriated. This, coupled with the recognition of IPRs as
an investment, would mean that IPRs could receive protection under
an IIA in theory. In the absence of case law, there have been
arguments made to this effect. 89 The expropriation of IPRs will be
dealt with in more detail in the next section.
There are two different standards of protection in HAs: Relative
Standards of Treatment such as MFN9o and NT9 and absolute
87. Id. at para. 76.
88. White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final
Award, 1 12.3.2 (November 2011).
89. See Bertram Boie, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Through
Bilateral Investment Treaties. Is There a TRIPS Plus Dimension? (NCCR Trade
Regulation Swiss Nat'l Ctr. of Competence in Research, Working Paper No. 2000/19
2010), who argues that the "full protection and security" provision in many BITs
should apply to IPR. See also Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights as an
Investment: Options for Developing Countries, 6(2) TRANSNATI'L DISPUTE MGMT. 1
(August 2009).
90. MFN obligations are almost universally found in international trade and
investment treaties. As a practical matter, MFN has been less controversial than NT
as most states do not adopt measures that discriminate between foreign countries,
with the exception of preferential trade and investment agreements. However some
of its issues are the same as those of NT, such as the following: What is the
appropriate comparator group? What are "like circumstances"? What is differential
treatment and its intent? The most important issue recently has been to what extent
MFN in a treaty allows for the import of a standard from another treaty, which was
not agreed between the two states contesting a dispute. In one case, it was argued by
an Argentinean investor that the dispute settlement procedure in Spain - Chile BIT
was more favorable than the procedure agreed between Argentina and Spain and so
the investor should be able to take advantage of the procedure because of the MFN
clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT. The BIT between Spain and Argentina required
an 18 month delay before a claim could be made under the treaty, while in the BIT
between Spain and Chile, there was no such requirement. Tribunal agreed with
Argentina partly on the basis that at the time of negotiations of BIT, the 18 months
condition had been sought by Argentina and was not usually included in Spain's
treaties as evidenced by the agreement with Chile. It supported its conclusion by
noting that the overall goal of IIAs is to have favorable conditions for investment.
This decision of tribunal in Maffezini permits claimants to cherry pick the most
favorable standards from other treaties.
91. National treatment requires treatment of foreign investors that is no less
favorable than treatment of investors of the host state. No less favorable does not
mean the same treatment necessarily. National treatment prohibits both
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standards of treatment, such as fair and equitable treatment (FET),
prohibition on expropriation without compensation, and limitations
on the use of performance requirements and restriction on the
transfer of funds.
B. Trademark Owner as Foreign Investor and Claimant
The ability of investors from one party state to seek financial
compensation from the other party state through binding arbitration
on the grounds that the other party state has failed to comply with its
obligations under a treaty is a particular feature of HAs. This distinct
quality fulfills investor's needs in the following ways:
* It avoids exposure of the investor to the uncertainties of a host
state's laws and regulations by creating a separate treaty based
set of rules to govern host state conduct.92
* It gives investors an alternative to the judicial system of the
host state to seek relief from actions of the host state.
* Investors can determine when there has been a breach of a
treaty obligation and initiate a claim.93
* It is unnecessary for an investor to rely on his home state
espousing his claim. There may be various reasons that a state
may not want to make a claim against another state in
diplomatic relations.94
discriminatory treatment expressed in law (de jure) and discriminatory treatment
resulting from the application of the law in fact (de facto).
In terms of the benefit of NT to an investor, it offers the investor a level playing field
and protects the investor from discrimination. However, for host states, it reduces
the possibility of favoring domestic firms, unless exceptions or reservations are
expressly introduced into agreements to allow discrimination such as is commonly
done in the case of government procurement, domestic subsidies to local business or
taxation etc. The U.S. Model BIT creates exclusions from MFN & NT for these
kinds of government actions in addition to a general exception for security. Host
states could also use a positive list, such that NT is only applicable to sectors covered
in the list and not common to all.
92. Zachary Douglas, The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty
Interpretation off the Rails, 2 J. INT. DiSP. SETTLEMENT 97, 109 (2011).
93. Lorenzo Melchionda, Jurisprudence arbitrale: Les tensions entre la volont6
des arbitres de traiter les parties sur un pieds d'dgalitd et la prise en compte des
int6rits de PEtat / des collectivit6s conc6dantes. Contrepoint [Arbitral
Jurisprudence: The Tensions Between the Arbitrator's Concerns About Treating the
Parties Equally and Taking into Account the Needs of the State/or Concession
Authority - Contrepoint], 4 REVUE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES
336, 336-52 (2013) (Fr.).
94. THE EFFFCr OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL
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* Finally, committing to investor-state dispute settlement could
have advantages for a host state95 as:
o It sends a positive signal to investors that it is committed
96
to offering a predictable and secure investment regime.
o It creates an incentive to develop domestic polices
favorable to attracting new investment and maintaining
on-going investment including policies that are
predictable, certain and transparent.
o It locks in pro-investment, market opening reform by
making it difficult to go back to change domestic policy.
The disadvantages for host states include the following:
* In investor-state arbitration, investors only pursue their
commercial interest and do not bother about host state policy
goals or the public interest.
* This is not like state-to-state dispute settlement, in which
states may apply restraint with respect to pursuing claims. For
example, states may not pursue an investor's claim against
another state out of concern for their relationship with the
other state or because they have measures similar to those
that the investor is concerned about that they would not want
challenged.97
* The cost of being a party to investor-state arbitration is high.
Awards can be large and the costs of participating in
98
arbitration, even if the state is successful, are significant.
* Regulatory Chill - Because of the high costs of investor-state
arbitration, states may be reluctant to enact measures that
might be a breach of their obligations. This chilling effect is
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS
(Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).
95. See Martins Paparinskis, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the (New) Law
ofState Responsibility, 24(2) EUR. J. INT'L L. 617, 630-31 (2013).
96. See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An
Evaluation ofBITs and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 67 (2005).
97. See James Crawford, International Protection of Foreign Direct Investments:
Between Clinical Isolation and Systemic Integration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM CLINICAL ISOLATION TO SYSTEMIC
INTEGRATION? 23,25 (Rainer Hofmann and Christian Tams eds., 2011).
98. Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the
Investment Treaty System (2012), available at www.iilj.org/courses/documents/
Robertsclash.pdf.
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exacerbated by arbitration decisions that are inconsistent and
that have adopted surprising interpretations of investment
obligations."
* Investors cannot be made accountable for their actions in
investor-state arbitration.
* Arbitration process gives rise to concerns regarding its
legitimacy and democratic accountability including (a) Lack of
transparency (b) Lack of access to Civil Society (NGOS) to
the process (c) Lack of knowledge on the part of tribunals
regarding non-investment issues related to public policy
considerations such as human rights, and the environment (d)
Limited knowledge on the part of tribunals about host state
domestic laws and policies that must be interpreted in
*100arbitration cases.
o Another key issue is that arbitral decisions have been
inconsistent, making obligations less predictable. There is
a huge debate currently regarding how to address this
issue.
All the above concerns are of a serious nature and have led many
states to re-consider the benefits of investor-state dispute arbitration
of HAs commitments in their present form.10
99. See UN Conference on Trade and Development, Issues Note No. 2
Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact on Investor-State Claims,
IIA Issues Note No. 2 (December 2010), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/do
cs/webdiaeia20l06_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD].
100. See HOWARD MANN, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, BUSINESS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: KEY ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES, 25-29 (International Institute
for Sustainable Development 2008). For relevant arbitral case law, see Mondev
International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
Award, 144 (Oct. 11, 2002); Tdcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 116-22 (May 29, 2003);
Azurix Corp v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award,
311-12 (July 14, 2006); In the Matter ofan Int'l Arb. Under Chapter 11 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (Methanex Corp. v. U.S.),
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL) Award (Aug. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/5 1052.pdf; CMS Gas Transmission Co.
v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 114-121 (May 12,
2005).
101. See James Crawford, International Protection of Foreign Direct Investments.:
Between Clinical Isolation and Systemic Integration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM CLINICAL ISOLATION TO SYSTEMIC
INTEGRATION? 23,25 (Rainer Hofmann and Christian Tams eds., 2011).
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VI. Regulating Trademark Expropriation
Every state has the right to expropriate, so long as it is for a
public purpose (e.g., road or rail construction), not arbitrary or
discriminatory (applicable to both foreign and domestic investors), in
accordance with due process of law (i.e., in accordance with basic
standards of fair procedure, proper notice, allowing access to a
process to challenge the expropriation) and accompanied by adequate
102
compensation. These requirements are generally expressed either
in customary international law or national laws and the only issues
are what state actions constitute expropriation and what the standard
for compensation is. The regime of expropriation needs to be further
defined in order to explain why IPR violation can result in a breach of
HAs expropriation clause.
A. The International Regime of Expropriation
The extent of the power of expropriation is linked to how
broadly investment and property are defined and treated in an IIA.
A broad definition of investment that most HAs contain includes
licenses, IPRs, and other government concessions in contracts. HAs
usually refer to three kinds of expropriation or takings: Direct,
Indirect, and measures equivalent or tantamount to expropriation.'0 3
Direct takings or physical expropriation means that the agency
or the government materially eliminates the property rights of the
owner, an act that implies a deprivation of the material ownership
and legal control of the owner with respect to the thing.'04 Indirect
expropriation is akin to direct expropriation in terms of effects but
does not necessarily entail the physical taking of the property.os
102. There are two kinds of expropriation. Direct: This form of expropriation is
relatively clear. It occurs when a state takes over investor's property. Indirect:
Some sort of government action that substantially affects an investor's ability to use
its property, but in which there is no formal transfer of property to the state. It is less
clear when an indirect expropriation has taken place.
103. Relevant discussion may refer to Jan Paulsson & Zachary Douglas, Indirect
Expropriation in Investment Treaty Arbitrations, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT DISPUTES, PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS 145,
(Norbert Horn ed., 2004).
104. Crispulo Marmolejo Gonzalez, Regulatory Takings: A Real Globalization of
Property Rights?, Latin American and Caribbean Law and Economics Association,
12th Annual Law and Economics Meeting (2008), http://works.bepress.com/
crispulo-m armolejo-gonzalez26.
105. MUTHUCUMARSWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 182 (2010).
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Measures tantamount, or equivalent, to expropriation, refer to
regulatory takings that can be very broad, with profound implications.
Contracting parties to IIAs undertake not to resort to
expropriation unless it is non-discriminatory, for a public purpose,
compensable (prompt, adequate and effective), and done in
accordance with due process. Expropriation that does not conform to
the above conditions is considered a breach of treaty obligations, and
compensation could be aggravated in cases of proscribed
expropriation.
The broad definition of expropriation through "measures
tantamount or equivalent to expropriation" means that all government
measures, policies, and state laws that affect foreign investment in any
way could be regarded as expropriation. In Metalclad,"o the NAFTA
tribunal confirmed this understanding and held that expropriation need
not be open and deliberate, but could also be covert or incidental
interference that deprives the owner of the economic benefit of his
property.
Regarding indirect expropriations, IIAs must balance between a
state's right to regulate for legitimate reasons without having to
compensate an investor and to protect an investor from losing
substantial benefits of his property. ' The treaty needs to address the
issue of whether a government regulation, even a bona-fide one
enacted for a public purpose, had a substantial deprivation effect on
an investor, to the extent that the regulation could be considered an
"indirect expropriation" and trigger an obligation to pay
compensation. The answers from arbitral cases are inconsistent.
Canadian FIPA model Annex B.3(1) expressly describes what an
indirect expropriation is. The Canadian model says that an indirect
expropriation is a measure or a series of measures that have an effect
equivalent to direct expropriation, followed by details of the list of
factors to be considered.0 8
106. Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, 103 (August 20, 2000).
107. Rachel D. Edsall, Indirect Expropriation under NAFTA and DR-CAFTA:
Potential Inconsistencies in the Treatment of State Public Welfare Regulations, 86
B.U. L. REV. 958, 958-59 (Oct. 2006).
108. The Parties confirm their shared understanding that: a) Indirect
expropriation results from a measure or series of measures of a Party that have an
effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright
seizure; b) The determination of whether a measure or series of measures of a Party
constitute an indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that
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The discussion of expropriation cannot be complete without
addressing the issue of the correct compensation standard. One
common way in which the standard [for correct compensation] is
expressed is prompt (without delay), effective (referring to the form
in which it is paid which means, generally, a convertible currency) and
adequate (fair market value, book value, or sometimes accounting
value). The other compensation standard advocated by some
developing countries is appropriate or equitable compensation that is
generally understood to represent a lower standard that takes into
account the host country's ability to pay.109 Investors may not like
this definition because it is less certain and less likely to fully
compensate them for losses. Another issue is whether damages
should be reduced if an investor has not taken steps to mitigate its
loss.110
B. Determining an Indirect Expropriation of the Trademark Owner
Thus, for an investor to proceed against a host state, he must be
able to make out a case for expropriation based on the recognition of
his investments. But initiating and succeeding in an investment claim
against a host state based on the violation of IP is tricky given the
obligations the state may have under TRIPS. Even if it is established
that IPRs constitute an investment, it would be meaningless unless it
can be enforced against the host state. Under the BIT regime, the
state cannot be sued unless it actively participates in the violation of
an investor's property rights. However, most IP violations, e.g.,
piracy, counterfeiting, are the acts of private parties rather than the
considers, among other factors: i) The economic impact of the measure or series of
measures, although the sole fact that a measure or series of measures of a Party has
an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment does not establish that an
indirect expropriation has occurred; ii) The extent to which the measure or series of
measures interfere with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and iii)
The character of the measure or series of measures; c) Except in rare circumstances,
such as when a measure or series of measures are so severe in the light of their
purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied
in good faith, nondiscriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied to
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.
109. Norah Gallagher & Wenhua Shan, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES, POLICIES
AND PRACTICE §8.49 & § 8.65 (2009).
110. The last thing to address is whether this obligation of compensation for
expropriation should be subject to reservation or exceptions. It may be argued on
the investors' side that, where there has been an expropriation, some obligation to
compensate is required.
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state. Though there may be some cause in the state omitting its
obligation to adequately protect IPRs, unless the state fails to fulfill
its TRIPS obligations, it is hard to find a cause of action.
This is because TRIPS represents a minimum level of necessary
compliance obligations with regard to the enforcement of IPRs that
do not go beyond the establishment of a procedure for redressing
violations of IPRs. Courts and tribunals will be unwilling to impose
any obligation beyond TRIPS standards. Even if a state implicitly
allows for mass piracy, the investor is not on strong ground in
claiming expropriation because the state is not taking away the
investor's title to the property and the investor has no cause of action
in the state's omission. Compulsory Licenses and plain packaging on
the other hand represent a closer convergence of TRIPS regime and
BITs. However, these issues are dealt with in greater detail later in
the paper.
VII. Treating Trademark Owners Fairly and Equitably
If the violation of IPRs should lead to an investment claim, we
believe that the violation of the FET standard is the most likely claim
to succeed. Although the FET standard is not new in International
Investment Law, there is no precise, unified, normative definition of
FET. FET is one of the most controversial clauses in International
Investment Law, and is applied differently by different arbitrators.
This is probably because wording of such clauses is not uniform as
many countries draft their own version of FET clauses. According to
the UNCTAD survey on FET, there are seven different categories of
FET provisions."' Each of these FET clauses would have their own
conception of what the FET standard should constitute. Arbitrators
on the other hand have not developed a standardized methodology to
interpret FET. The most common notion of the FET standard is that
it is designed to provide protection, security, stability and
predictability. In general, BITs have two different approaches to
FET clauses. In the former approach, FET is drafted as an
autonomous standard, while in the latter, FET is subordinated to
customary international law.112 These different approaches are the
source of divergent interpretations of the FET standard in IlAs.
111. UNCTAD, supra note 99.
112. Rudolf Dolzer, The Impact of International In vestment Treaties on Domestic
Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 953, 953 (2005).
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A. Fair and Equitable Treatment Generous Protection
There are two divergent approaches to the interpretation of
FET.113 This is evidenced from two differing decisions given on the
same set of facts by arbitral tribunals in 2001.114 In Lauder v. Czech
Republic, 11 a tribunal held that FET was limited to the minimum
standard of customary international law; while in CME v. Czech
Republic, the superiority of FET was emphasized.116 In Lauder, FET
was interpreted according to the precedent in customary international
law.11 But in CME, the tribunal held that FET is not limited by
customary international law, but is an independent standard that
should be interpreted according to international law principles.
Almost all investment claims invoke the FET obligation because
it covers a broad area of relations and because FET can relate to all
kinds of governmental action--including indirect expropriation. It is
also convenient to argue from the point of violation of FET standards
in disputes. If FET is held to be an independent standard, as in
CME, its scope is widened and it gives more discretion to
arbitrators.1 19 Some tribunals have noted the concern of countries
with an independent standard, but were reluctant to limit the FET
standard to customary international law. The question that follows is
what constitutes legal grounds for an autonomous FET standard and
113. Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID, Award, 606 (June
8, 2009).
114. Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment
Treaties, 39 INT'L LAw. 87, 94 (2005).
115. Ronald S Lauder v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final Award (September 3, 2001),
available athttp://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0451.pdf.
116. CME v Czech, Case T 8735-01, 155, (September 13, 2001) (expert opinion of
Professor Sacerdoti).
117. See also Loewen Group, Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, 128 (June
26, 2003), available at http://www.tjsl.edu/slomansonb/Loewen.pdf, (where the
tribunal found that the FET in Article 1105 of NAFTA, and full protection and
security were not free-standing obligations but were obligations to the extent that
they are recognized by customary international law).
118. Dolzer, Fair andEquitable Treatment, supra note 114, at 87.
119. Some scholars support an approach to interpretation of FET as an
autonomous standard. Among them is F.A. Mann who said FET is an 'overriding
obligation.' Patrick G. Foy and Robert J. C. Deane, commenting on this position,
noted that a tribunal would not be concerned with a minimum, maximum or average
standard. It will have to decide, taking into account all circumstances of the case,
whether it is fair and equitable. See OECD Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard
in International Investment Law, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A CHANGING
LANDSCAPE 73, 101 (2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/52/40077877.pdf.
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whether arbitrators can rely on this standard in addition to customary
120international law.
An autonomous approach to the interpretation of FET is valid
due to its specificity. Since FET covers all kinds of relations, its
development creates new relations and leads to the appearance of new
concepts in international investment law. Thus, arbitrators have to
make decisions taking into account numerous facts and details, and
considering customary international law (while not being limited by its
boundaries). An instance of this was evident in MTD v. Chile, which
held that "the meaning of what is fair and equitable is defined when
that standard is applied to a set of specific facts."121 Since there was no
reference to customary international law in the BIT in relation to FET,
the tribunal had to interpret it in accordance with the norms
established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT).122
The justification for a strict, autonomous FET standard is based
on the fact that foreign investors face the risk of abuse, discrimination,
and less favorable treatment than domestic or other companies.
Without an effective FET clause, they will be exposed to many
obstacles. Further, such investors cannot simply move their
investments to another country because this is very expensive,
especially in the case of "long-term investments."123 Appealing against
the host state's actions is not an easy process and requires great
financial resources, as well as considerable time and investigation.
Investors need protection not only from grossly unfair treatment by
host states, but also from indirect actions that could cause deterioration
120. TECMED S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/00/2, 155 (May 29, 2003) (held that FET should be interpreted according to
international law as an autonomous standard that is free standing and not limited by
the concept of minimum standard of customary international law. Extended
applicability of the FET stems from the basic goals of the treaty and goes beyond the
boundaries of custom established in international law). Glamis v. U.S., NAFATA,
http://italaw.com/documents/GlamisAward.pdf (admitted that some tribunals
expanded FET 'beyond customary international law, lead their reviewing tribunals
into an analysis of the treaty language and its meaning, as guided by Article 31(1) of
the Vienna Convention'). In OEPC v. Ecuador, Case No. UN 3467, based on a
BIT's preamble, FET standard was held to be a 'free-standing requirement.'
121. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, 109. n61 (May 25, 2004) (quote from Judge
Schwebel).
122. Id. $$ 111, 112.
123. Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 125, at 114.
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in an investor's position and are not obvious or "egregious." 124 Thus, it
may seem that expectations of investors are not justified due to these
"invisible" actions. 125
However, in Pope & Talbot, FET was found to be independent
of, rather than limited by, the phrase "treatment in accordance with
international law" and hence the minimum standard of customary
international law. 126 Arbitrators must not be concerned with
minimum or maximum levels of violation and should instead use FET
to censure all inappropriate behavior. 127
FET is as new as investment law and its jurisprudence is evolving.
There is an opinion that modem FET was created by arbitrators to
deal with investment disputes. When tribunals have to deal with the
wide range of relations, conduct, and practice covered by FET,
arbitrators have no choice but to refer to the VCLT. As the FET
standard develops in practice, the treaty based autonomous FET itself
becomes a part of customary international law.128 However some
scholars claim that it is unclear if the FET standard is a part of
customary international law at this point in time.129 Due to its
multifaceted nature and the diversity of claims, FET has already been
interpreted and applied independently in practice by different
tribunals. FET can be interpreted according to customary international
law, but there are cases when it is difficult to find a suitable practice or
custom.130 The 1926 Neer casel31 has been commented on so often that
124. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Gov't of Canada, NAFTA Arb. Trib., Award in
Respect of Damages, 57 (May 31, 2002).
124. Id.
124. Id.
125. Andrew P. Tuck, The 'Fair and Equitable Treatment' Standard Pursuant to
the Investment Provisions of the U.S. Free Trade Agreements with Peru, Colombia
and Panama, 16 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 385 (2010).
12 6. Id.
127. Robert M Ziff The Sovereign Debtor's Pison: Analysis of the Argentine
Cnsis Arbitrations and the Implications for Investment Treaty Law, 10 RIcH. J.
GLOBALL. & Bus. 345(2011).
128. Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the
International Law of Foreign Investment, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 237 (2008).
129. Raphael De Vietri, FET for Foreign Investment: What Is The Current
Standard at InternationalLaw. 14 INT'L TRADE & Bus. L. REV. 414 (2011).
130. In such cases, the task is even more demanding as the standard has to be
developed ab novo in the absence of any rule or precedent in any other field of
international law. Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 114, at 105.
131. (1926) 4 R.I.A.A. 60. The case brought before the U.S.- Mexico General
Claims Commission related to the murder of a US national in Mexico, where the
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physical security issues considered by it have evolved to handle
contemporary investment relations.132 Evolution of the jurisprudence
of FET will blur the line between customary international law and
autonomous FET standard.
The debate on an independent FET standard is due to
divergence of FET provisions in IIAs. NAFTA and some BITs
determine FET by the minimum standard of treatment in customary
international law. But many IIAs neither specify the FET standard
nor refer to customary international law. If there is no identical
precedent in previous decisions or custom, the only way to solve a
dispute is to weigh facts and apply FET as per its ordinary meaning.
If there are no indications to the contrary, "the better view is to give
it an autonomous meaning." 134 Concerns over an independent FET
are natural as it gives arbitrators wide discretion. This is especially so
if it is not clear whether FET relates to all provisions of an agreement.
If FET relates to all provisions, it may "restrict host state regulatory
control.",3 5 If not, arbitrators are in the best position to decide
investment claims by considering the peculiarities of a certain case
without limiting themselves to the frame of unsuitable precedents.136
Even in NAFTA's jurisprudence, FET has been applied
independently without the limitation of customary international
law. So, it is hard to conclude that an autonomous FET gives too
much discretion to arbitrators only because the separating line
between independent FET and FET-related customary international
law becomes difficult to discern. An evolving FET will narrow the
claimant alleged the authorities had failed to show due diligence in prosecuting the
criminals. It was one of the first case to address issues of denial of justice, fair and
equitable treatment, and minimum standard of treatment.
132. ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, 184 (Jan. 9, 2003) (The tribunal held that" ... FET must
be disciplined by being based
133. Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, 19 (June 8,
2009).
134. Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6(3)
J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 357, 385 (June 2005).
135. Asha Kaushal, How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the
Foreign Investment Regime, 50 Harv. Int'l L.J. 491, 511 (2009).
136. This view must be understood with the knowledge that a custom is applied
when cases have similar or related issues.
137. David A. Gantz & David D. Caron, Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, 97(4)
AM. J. OF INT'L L. 937 (Oct. 2003).
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discretionary space available to the host state.3 To avoid this, states
should clarify the FET standard based on existing practice.
B. Determining a Breach of FET
Investors could be encouraged to file an investment claim based
on the breach of FET since tribunals have discretion in interpreting
the standard. Tribunals are not confined to the boundaries of
customary international law in interpreting the standard. Since there
have been no reported cases on this issue, or a tribunal adjudicating
IPR claims, and since IPRs are intangible property, a prospective
tribunal must be creative in placing an obligation on the state (if any
at all) within the confines of an IIA.
The difficulty in framing an investment claim based on a
violation of IP is that most IP violations are made by private
individuals rather than the state. In such a case, it is hard to trace the
obligation back to the state. However, Boie argues that IPRs can be
protected under the "full protection and security" clause found in
many BITs. This type of clause has been interpreted by tribunals to
mean the adoption of reasonable measures to protect investors from
physical harm and violence from police and security forces.139
However, Mendenhalll40 points out that this obligation is not a strict
liability but due diligence. He uses the precedent in Laude 41 that
excluded the obligation of tates to provide full protection and security
from acts that cannot be attributed to the state.
There is also the question of whether the full protection and
security obligation extends to intangible assets. This clause has been
interpreted to mean the protection of the "physical integrity of an
investment against interference by use of force." 14 2 However, both
Mendenhall and Boie cite the Siemens143 case, which extended the
obligation beyond mere physical protection. Yet, Mendenhall notes
that the clause in Siemens was peculiar and referred to "full
138. Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 114, at 105.
139. Boie, supra note 89, at 37.
140. James E. Mendenhall, Fair Treatment of Intellectual Property Rights Under
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 6(2) TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT. 13 (Aug. 2009),
available at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1452.
141. Id. at 9.
142. Id. at 10.
143. Siemens v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on
Jurisdiction, (Feb. 6 2007).
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protection and legal security" rather than mere physical security.
Despite this, he argues that to restrict the full protection and security
obligation to physical assets would be too rigid and without any
principled basis. He instead submits that where the BIT did not make
a distinction between tangible and intangible assets, the protection
should apply equally to both.1 The analysis most relevant to our
present study is presented by Voon and Mitchelll 45 in their analysis of
Phillip Morris' claim against Australia. Noting the precedent in AES
Summit v. Hungary, they posit that the clause cannot be used to
limit the right of a state to legislate and frame policy. Biadgleng on
the other hand disagrees with the use of the full protection and
security clause for intangible assets, based on the U.S. Model BIT,
which clarifies that the provision should only apply to the exercise of
police power. 147 He further argues that the FET standard is more
useful in cases based on IPRs because the state, under the due
process obligation, has to make procedures for the protection of IPRs
available.14 In a point, also made by Voon and Mitchell, Biadgleng
alludes to the fact that the full protection and security obligation itself
is sourced from the FET standard and is meaningless with respect to
IPR.149 Further, he allays fears of investors using IIAs for ordinary
breach of IPRs by pointing out that FET can only be used when the
host state adopts policies that are an abuse of due process and are
150discriminatory.
An area in which the acts of a state can amount to expropriation
of IPRs is that of Compulsory Licenses. Since the state does not
transfer the IP to itself, a Compulsory License is not a direct
expropriation; it can be classified as an indirect expropriation because
it could deprive the investor of his interest in the property. Building
144. Mendenhall, supra note 140, at 10.
145. Tania Voon & Andrew Mitchell, Time to Quit? Assessing International
Investment Claims Against Plain Tobacco Packaging in Australia, 14(3) J. INT'L
ECON. L. 515, 536 (2011). See also Mercurio, Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products,
supra note 12.
146. AES Summit Generation v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award,
1 13.3.1 (Sept. 17, 2010).
147. Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng, IP Rights Under Investment Agreements: The
TRIPS Plus Implications for Enforcement and Protection of Public Interest, at 26 (S.
Ctr. Research Papers, No. 8, 2006).
14 8. Id.
149. Id.; Voon and Mitchell, supra note 145, at 537.
150. Biadgleng, supra note 147, at 537.
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on Paulson and Douglas,' two stages of expropriation, Gibson sets
out a three stage test to assess if a Compulsory License amounts to
indirect expropriation: (1) Does the level of deprivation constitute a
taking? (2) Does it rise to the level of an indirect expropriation? (3)
What is the character of the Government action? He argues that the
third stage is crucial in the case of Compulsory Licenses because
TRIPS describes grounds on which a Compulsory License may be
issued. In such cases, a claim for compensation cannot succeed. if
the Compulsory License is not TRIPS compliant, Gibson finds that
Article 31(h), which requires the state pay adequate compensation,
can be used to decide a claim of indirect appropriation.5 3 On similar
lines, Correa's criteria for compulsory licenses is that they should be
deemed to be an indirect expropriation unless (a) the state has
complied with the customary principle of fair and equitable
treatment, (b) the grant serves a public interest, and (c) compensation
is provided under the rule of "prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation."154 While there is speculation as to which standards
should apply to an IP claim in a BIT and whether it will be successful,
the lack of precedent in over 50 years since the first BIT is a
mitigating factor in such analysis. Another, more significant rationale
for the lack of cases in this area, is the fact that IPRs are
internationally administered by TRIPS, and resorting to an
investment claim raises questions of overlapping regulation. The next
section reframes this question in the context of TRIPS and the
dispute resolution mechanism available under the WTO.
VIII. Conclusion
TRIPS represents the international consensus with respect to the
administration of IPRs. It was meant to create a global minimum
standard for the protection and enforcement of IPRs across borders.
For many reasons, it has been unable to accomplish this goal and
today TRIPS, as an agreement, lacks finality. TRIPS incorporates
the important provisions of National Treatment and MFN in Articles
151. Christopher S. Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment
Arbitration: The Case of Indirect Expropnation, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 357, 382
(2010). See inha Gibson note 153, citing Paulsson & Douglas, supra note 103, at 145-
46.
152. Id. at 383-89.
153. Christopher S Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment
Arbitration: The Case of IndirectExpropriation, 6(2) TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT
154. Correa, supra note 50, at 14-16.
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3.1 and 4 respectively, but it does not contemplate an enforcement
mechanism for these standards as illustrated by the United States -
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 dispute. Instead, it
lays down guidelines for such an enforcement mechanism, many of
which are optional. The design of the actual enforcement processes is
left to the discretion of the state. In this regard, our study of the
United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998
case leads to the conclusion that TRIPS only offers very limited
protection to foreign owners of trademarks.
While TRIPS itself is an achievement in terms of establishing a
semblance of a global IP regime, IIAs offer trademark owners a better
option for enforcing IPRs. FET, NT, and MFN are well established
standards in IIAs, the breach of which can be used as a cause of action
against a host state. Basically, IIAs subject states to a high degree of
exposure from foreign owners of trademarks. Conversely, we can only
conclude that trademarks' foreign owners should look rather at the
potential broad definition of investment in the IIAs instead of at the timid
promises of TRIPS. Of course, not all countries are bound by an
investment treaty, but the basic treaty MFN provision may trigger the
requested international protection for the benefit of many trademarks
owners.
In this connection, the dispute between Philip Morris and
Australia may open new grounds. Should the arbitral Tribunal favor
a broad interpretation of the definition of investment and opines that
trademarks have to be protected under the treaty, it would send a
strong signal to the business community that IIAs are likely to play a
great role in the protection of trademarks. In any case, a role which is
greater than TRIPS. It would be an irony in the history of
international economic law to have an international IP treaty less
relevant to trademark owners than investment treaties.
Such a very likely outcome, however leads to a fundamental
question with far reaching implications on the policy side: From the
public policy point of view, should trademark and, more broadly,
intellectual property, be included in the definition of investment in
IIAs? The question for host states that are members of the WTO is:
When TRIPS obligations are already in place, why add an additional
obligation regarding the protection of intellectual property in an
investment treaty? The rationale to include IPRs from an investor's
point of view is that they represent an increasing proportion of the
value of investments. Also, weak implementation by developing
countries has meant that the inclusion of IPRs in IIAs as a kind of
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investment is important for investors. Including IPRs in the
definition of investment secures the rights of investors but exposes
host state's IP measures to treaty obligations and investor state
dispute settlement. This may provide much greater assurance of
compliance than state-to-state dispute settlement under TRIPS.
The other issue, after the decision to include IP in the definition,
is how IP should be included. For example, should stand alone IP
rights be protected? Should IIAs protect patents in an industrial
process or copyrights in an artistic work alone or only if they are
related to another form of investment? Should certain kinds of IPRs
be excluded from the definition, like traditional knowledge, which is
not even included in TRIPS? One approach is to protect only those
that are in accordance with domestic law. Another approach is to
include the IP in the definition of investment, but go on to provide
specific exceptions to preserve specific kinds of policy flexibility for
host states. For example, in the U.S. and Canadian BITs,
compulsory licensing of patents for pharmaceuticals is excluded from
the obligation prohibiting expropriation without compensation.
Similarly, these models allow derogations from MFN & NT that are
permitted under TRIPS. State actions that are permitted by these
exceptions are not considered a breach of treaty.
155. See Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International Investment and
Domestic Health Protections - Is a General Exceptions Clause a Forced Perspective
39AM. JL. & MED. 332(2013).
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